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ABSTRACT 
The first objective of this paper is to address the question what the Government's 
economic policy and regulatory goals for consumer protection are. The second 
objective is to determine what tools are available to the Government to 
implement its goals. The third and ultimate objective is to determine whether or 
not the existing policy and goals require (and allow) the Government to regulate 
further, to protect consumers now the Internet is being used as method of 
transacting. 
To achieve these objectives the first part of this paper discusses the issue of 
consumer protection in New Zealand. In particular; its evolution culminating in 
the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 and the Fair Trading Act 1986, the policy of 
consumer protection and the regulatory tools used to implement the 
Government's goals and policy to prevent (or correct) a market failure. 
The Second part of the paper discusses what the Internet might mean for 
consumers transacting on line and in particular what new consumer issues it 
raises. I determine in this part of the paper that the Government ' s policy does not 
need to and has not changed because of the issues raised by the Internet. 
However given the likely importance of electronic commerce to the economy 
there is an additional goal- to increase consumer confidence in the Internet. I then 
discuss the different tools , both existing and new, that could be used to increase 
consumer confidence in on line transactions, including the possibility of 
regulating the architecture of the Internet. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and annexures) 
comprises 17,902 words. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In New Zealand the Government is focused on creating efficient markets because 
efficient markets increase social welfare. In efficient markets the consumer is 
sovereign. The consumer dictates what products and services are produced, at 
what price and to what level of quality. However this can only work in an 
efficient market. The Government considers this can be best achieved by leaving 
individuals to choose which transactions they want to enter into. When a market 
is efficient the following benefits will be obtained by society: 
(i) Prices in the economy will include, whenever possible the cost of all the 
resources involved in the transaction; 
(ii) Transactions will be left to private decisions with a minimum of 
constraints on participants; and 
(iii) Transaction costs are minimised. 
The theory is that efficient markets will ensure that goods are produced with a 
minimum of waste and resources will be distributed efficiently ("production 
efficiency"). That is, consumers will be able to maximise their utility (or 
satisfaction) so that any reallocation of resources would make one party worse 
off ("allocati vel y efficient"). 
The Ministry of Consumer Affairs states that: 1 
The economic theory that underpins this strategy holds that voluntary market 
transactions benefit the community as a whole, because each consumer gets a benefit 
from the product or service they purchase that is greater than the social cost of 
producing these products or services. That is, an economy based on voluntary 
transactions operates more efficiently than other models . 
Sometimes however markets are not efficient, this could be for a variety of 
reasons, for example, the consumer may have insufficient information to fully 
assess the benefits and risks of a transaction. When this occurs and the consumer 
1 The Ministry of Consumer Affairs, The Economic Context of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, 
(Wellington, August 1999),3, [The Economic Context of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs]. 
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makes a decision which does not increase the consumers welfare (at least in the 
consumer's opinion) because the information they have been given is incorrect or 
incomplete, then the consumer will want to seek redress. If no redress is 
available or it is too expensive, the supplier's welfare will be increased at the 
expense of the consumer. 
The risk that a consumer takes when entering transactions will vary according to 
the type of purchase the consumer is making. For complex items, that is, goods 
and services that are outside the range of experience of the consumer the risk to 
the consumer will be higher. Under these circumstances the consumer may take 
action to investigate the purchase further, for example, by collecting information 
about the supplier or the goods and services that they are contemplating 
purchasing. 
In New Zealand the private sector provides services to reduce the transaction 
costs to the consumer. The Consumers' Institute is a privately funded advice 
provider which consumers can join for a fee. Other independent organisations 
have been established to test products and sell the results (for example, the 
Automobile Association). These service providers, where available, could be 
accessed by the consumer to reduce the risk of a contemplated transaction. More 
recently a host of consumer advice web sites have appeared some of which are 
interactive and give free consumer advice. 
Traditionally however, market based solutions to problems however are often 
costly to the consumer and time consuming. 
When voluntary markets fail to the detriment of the consumer, consumers will 
see this as unfair and interest groups may then decide to lobby Government to 
intervene. The extent to which the Government will take any action as a result of 
pressure groups will be constrained by its prevailing policy, goals and principles. 
The prevailing policy of creating efficient markets through voluntary transactions 
will mean that the Government should only intervene to the extent necessary to 
redress a market failure and create a fair market. Where it can the will try to 
address the issue through self regulation. 
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The concept of Fairness has been described as equity. That is equals should be 
treated equally and unequals should be treated unequally.2 This description of 
fairness has its critics as it may be considered circular, after all what makes 
people equal or unequal? For a long time people were considered unequal on the 
basis of skin type, and in some countries people are considered unequal on the 
basis of religious beliefs. However, I suggest that what makes people equal may 
be transitive and alter as societies' change their normative values. In any case, 
fairness is a subjective concept and incorporates all of the inherent prejudices of 
the people attempting to define it (the prejudices will in most cases arise out of 
self interest). 
Zajac explains that there are two pillars of human behaviour which dictate what 
"public interest" is or how the definition of what is fair is arrived at; 
1. People tend to act in their own self interest; and 
2. They tend to seek and benefit from gains through exchange. 3 
Because·.of this Zajac suggests that regulation should provide incentives to work 
towards the goal. (In this paper I will discuss some of the tools that the 
Government has made available to address some of these issues). In this regard 
the free market is the most incentive, compatible regulatory regime. This 
however will not suffice where there are market failures and where the free . 
market is not meeting societal goals. 
Historically markets were regulated by social norms. Social norms arise when 
people live in communities, they dictate how people will act in public and to a 
lesser extent in private. Social norms are a form of regulation that.is enforced by 
the community. Over time however markets and the products got more complex 
grew as did rules and custom surrounding trade, these rules were enforced by the 
courts and slowly were incorporated into legislation. 
2 Edward E. Zajac, Political Economy of Fairness, paper back edition 1996 (MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts), 105 
3 Zajac, above n2, 158 
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The market place is now undergoing another critical change due to the advances 
of technology and, in particular, the Internet. The Internet provides consumers 
and firms with a new forum in which to share information, trade and engage in 
what is commonly called "electronic commerce". The trades may occur purely in 
cyberspace with no physical evidence of the trade occurring or they may be 
hybrid trades where some elements occur in the physical world (maybe 
registration or delivery) and others in cyberspace. Therefore the Internet changes 
the way in which consumers interact with suppliers. 
The Internet has features, which while not necessarily unique, provide enhanced 
benefits to consumers, however the same characteristics that create the benefits 
also magnify the potential risks to consumers. These characteristics are called 
'architecture' in this paper. The. architecture of the Internet has been described as 
including protocols, hardware, software and biometrics.4 
In this paper I am going to discuss the issue of whether or not the Government 
should regulate to protect consumers that transact on line, and if it should, the 
form the regulation should take. 
This paper is broadly divided into two parts; firstly I examine the issues of 
consumer protection, in general. I will not look at any particular industry or issue 
in depth, where they are referred to they will be used as an example only. 
Secondly I consider those issues in light of the evolution of the Internet as it is 
used to transact. 
In the first part, consumer protection, I will look at the evolution of consumer 
protection. That will involve a general discussion of the historical development 
of commercial law and consumer protection. I will then take a close look at the 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (CGA) and the Fair Trading Act 1986 (FT A). 
4 
Graham Greenleaf, "An Endnote on Regulating Cyberspace: Architecture Vs Law", (1998) 21 
UNSW Law Journal, 12; www.law.unsw.edu.au/unswlj/ecommerce/index.html, 
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The CGA and the Fr A are often considered the primary pieces of consumer 
protection law. 5 However it should be kept in mind that the Fr A and the CGA 
are not the only initiatives employed by the Government to protect the consumer. 
Other initiatives such as the Disputes Tribunal, which was established under the 
Disputes Tribunal Act 1988, ombudsmen and licensing service providers, are 
also examples of the methods the Government has developed to protect 
consumers in New Zealand. 
Even though much of the law was already settled by the common law, it is 
argued that the summary legislation of the type of the CGA and the Ff A is 
required to provide access to justice and to remove transaction costs. The 
Ministry of Consumer Affairs has identified the removal of transaction costs as 
its main method of increasing market efficiency. 
After considering the CGA and Fr A I will look at the general policy behind 
consumer protection legislation. I propose that there are two overarching 
considerations that take place when the Government considers legislating, market 
efficiency and fairness. 
I will then consider the range of tools that the Government has available at its 
disposal to intervene in the market should it consider it necessary. I look not 
only at what is available at a domestic level but, because of the increasingly 
global market which consumers are able to transact in, I will also briefly consider 
what the Government could do (or participate in) at an international level. 
In the first part of the paper I am not proposing to answer the question of whether 
or not we should have consumer protection legislation, I am proposing to assess 
why we have it and the extent to which it achieves the goals of the 'legislator. 
In the second part of the paper I consider whether or not the existing policy and 
goals of consumer protection can be applied to the Internet. To do this I look at 
whether the policy goals of the Government need to change because of the 
Internet. However before I can do that I need to ascertain what it is that makes 
5 Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington), Common Law Collection, Consumer 
Protection. www.law.unsw.edu.au/unswlj/ecornmerce/index.html. 
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the Internet different. I have identified that the architecture of the Internet is what 
makes it such an exciting new tool for trade, however it is the technical features 
which have potential to cause consumers problems and reduce the confidence the 
consumer has in the medium. 
I will discuss what the Government can do to increase consumer confidence 
when transacting on line, some of the tools that are currently used may be helpful 
and to the extent they are not, consideration is given to new tools that may be 
developed. In this part of the paper I will consider articles written by Lawrence 
Lessig and Graham Greenleaf who suggest that if governments want to regulate 
at all, they should regulate the architecture of the Internet. 
II. DEFINITIONS 
This part contains the definition of terms as they are used throughout the paper. 
A Internet 
The Internet refers to an informal, world-wide network of computers linking 
millions of users. The Internet provides users with various methods by which 
they can communicate with others including the World Wide Web (www), email, 
chat rooms and bulletin boards.6). Various industry bodies have been established. 
to create the protocols by which the Internet operates, however there is no 
governing body that patrols the content all of the web sites and no one can be 
banned from using it.7 The Internet is an open platform that is self regulated. 
6 Bulletin boards are now becoming less prevalent due to the ease of using the World Wide Web. 
7 The Government may be able to limit, through legislation, what content its citizens can look at, 
by legislating, for example censorship laws. 
. 7. 
B The World Wide Web 
The World Wide Web (www) is a huge network of web pages. Each web page 
is stored on a computer called a server. A person or a single entity normally 
controls the information on a web page. Simply posting information on the 
World Wide Web potentially makes it available worldwide unless the owner puts 
in place security policies to only allow pre approved visitors to the site. When a 
person visits a web site or enters into any activity on the Internet they are "on 
line". 
C Consumer 
Consumer means a natural person who purchases goods and services for personal 
consumption, which may include investment. It does not include those 
purchasing to resell or otherwise in furtherance of business pursuits. 
D Consumer Protection 
Consum~r protection means the regulations and initiatives that exist to increase a 
consumer's sovereignty in the market or to redress a perceived unfairness. 
In relation to consumers participating in market activities, consumer protection 
can manifest in regulations for two reasons: 
(i) To increase consumers ' sovereignty in the market. This is normally done · 
in response to market failure and is aimed at increasing market efficiency; 
and 
(ii) To redress "unfairness". 
The focus in this paper is on consumer protection regulation, primarily 
Government regulation, which responds to a perceived market failure. I will also 
discuss consumer protection regulation which has arisen in response to perceived 
unfairness to the extent that the regulation is considered necessary to encourage 
consumers to participate in electronic commerce (in particular the Privacy Act 
1993). In some cases the reasons for the regulation will overlap. 
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III. CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Commercial Law is the body of law that has evolved around the contract 
between the buyer and the seller at common law. However, consumer protection 
must go further than that as the contract is not the only concern of the parties nor 
is the contract only a concern for the parties to it. It is also necessary to protect 
the concerns of other parties, for example, it is necessary to look after the 
interests of the consuming public at large. Consumers need to know that certain 
products will not be injurious to health or life, that they are not paying monopoly 
prices and that they will not be deceived by false and misleading advertising. 
There is also the greater interest of the state, the national economy needs to be 
protected, the workforce needs to be productive, the economy needs to be able to 
attract investment and inflation needs to be controlled. Vendors will be 
concerned whether other vendors are engaging in unfair trade practices or 
monopolistic behaviour, the creditors of suppliers and consumers are interested 
in the .terms and enforceability of contracts, and victims of theft and 
misappropriation will have an interest in whether their goods can later be resold. 
When the Government regulates all these interests need to be balanced. In this 
paper I focus principally on the relationship between the consumer and supplier, 
and the consumer's role in the market. 
While in many respects the interests of consumers and businesses entering into 
transactions for the supply of goods and services converge, consumers are more 
vulnerable to market failures because a consumer is usually without the resources 
or expertise of a larger commercial enterprise. 
A consumer will often not be an expert in the type of product that they are 
purchasing, this issue is becoming more prevalent with the advances in 
technology and the resulting complexity of goods. As a result consumers rely 
heavily on the information the supplier discloses about the goods and services 
they anticipate purchasing. A business on the other hand, will often purchase a 
number of the same type of goods in pursuance of its business activities, thereby 
developing an expertise in which goods are more suitable for the business's 
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purpose. Various businesses will have different uses for the same goods, 
whereas consumers will generally use goods for a very similar purpose. 
A supplier will have more incentive to negotiate terms and conditions and to 
provide remedies for customers that represent a large revenue stream and an 
ongoing relationship. Businesses will generally have greater buying power, and 
buy a larger quantity of goods and services at one time giving them greater 
negotiating power. 
However a consumer will have little power to dictate the terms of a transaction. 
Because of the comparatively low value of the transactions that consumers enter 
into it will be less economical to seek legal advice, negotiate a contract and seek 
remedies at law when entering into a transaction. Due to the comparative value 
of transactions businesses enter into it is more likely that it will be cost effective 
to seek legal advice prior to the transaction and to seek redress if the contract is 
not performed. 
A Evolution of Consumer Protection 
There have always been rules surrounding trade. At first the regulation of trade 
was by the community as people developed norms and trade practices to govern 
transactions. The original merchant law (lex mercatoria) developed international 
rules of trade that were enforced by "civilised states" and to that extent was . 
international law. In 18th Century England the only commercial legal rules that 
existed were to protect the merchants. Trade was considered to be the lifeblood 
of the nation. The concerns and interests of other parties that may suffer some 
loss or hardship as a result of the transaction were simply not considered. Once 
the common law courts assumed jurisdiction over merchant law the rules were 
developed within each state, a development that continues today. I will discuss 
later in paper how this border centric view of the law ·creates difficulties in an 
economy moving towards globalisation. 
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The common law courts also developed the rule of "caveat emptor".8 This rule 
became the default proposition of common law. The doctrine of "caveat emptor" 
states that: 9 
In the absence of fraud, and provided the goods were open to inspection before being 
purchased, the buyer could not complain of defects in the article he bought. He or she 
should have used his or her own judgement .. . for he or she could have exacted a 
warranty. 
Over time commercial law has evolved from that position through market 
transactions where it was recognised that the seller had additional obligations to 
the obligation to supply. Those obligations were implied into contracts by the 
courts of England. 10 New Zealand followed the United Kingdom and adopted the 
United Kingdom's common law rules for commercial transactions. These 
principles still apply to a large extent in New Zealand but additional rights and 
remedies have been given to consumers via legislation. The first such legislation 
enacted in New Zealand was the Sale of Goods Act 1908 which implied 
guarantees into contracts for the supply of goods. Today the principal pieces of 
consumer legislation in New Zealand are the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 
(CGA) and the Fair Trading Act 1986 (FT A). 
1. Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 
In March 1992 the Consumer Guarantees Bill (CGBill) was introduced. The 
CGBill was introduced by Hon. Katherine O'Regan (the then Minister of 
Consumer Affairs, on behalf of the Minister of Justice). The Minister, in her 
8 Pasely v Freeman (1789) 3 Term. Rep. 51. 
9 JF Burrows, J Finn and S Todd Law of Contract, (8th ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1992),164, 
[Law of Contract]. 
10 for example;In a sale by sample it was an implied term that the bulk should correspond to the 
sample, and the buyer should be able to compare the bulk to the sample; In a sale by description 
the goods should not only meet the description but should also be of merchantable quality; If the 
buyer gave the seller an explanation of the purpose for which she wanted the goods and that she 
relied on the seller's expertise then the seller must either disclaim responsibility or be deemed to 
have accepted this additional responsibility; and the seller must be in a position to give good title. 
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introductory speech put forward the following reasons for the introduction of the 
CGBill: 11 
(i) to clarify the rights and obligations of manufacturers, traders, service 
providers, and consumers in a way that is appropriate taking into 
consideration the demands of the modem market place; 
(ii) promote fair and efficient market place practices; 
(iii) enhance the consumer's ability to participate effectively in the market; 
(iv) benefit fair and ethical suppliers by clarifying their obligations; 
(v) benefit the economy generally; and 
(vi) set out clear standards of quality, fitness, durability and safety to promote 
fair and effective competition in the market place. 
The Hon. Katherine O'Regan then commented that the economic policies of the 
Government recognise that choice is the central element to consumer welfare and 
that consumer sovereignty in the market place is the central element of an 
efficient market. 12 
The Sale of Goods Act 1908 (the predecessor to the CGA) was criticised in her 
speech as being "archaic" and intended for transactions between merchants, and -
therefore, did not assist consumers in the modem market place. The CGA was 
seen as a way of ensuring that the current law was understood. The CGBill, the 
Minister said, was "about faimess". 13 
The essential principles of the CGA as introduced include: 
(i) Statutory Guarantees that apply to the supply of goods and services. The 
particular types of guarantee have been listed in Appendix A; 
11 (17 March 1992), NZPD522, 6901, [NZPD, 522]. 
12 NZPD, 522 above n 11, 6901. 
13 NZPD, 522 above n 11, 6901 . 
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(ii) Consumers are given an equality of bargaining power with the providers 
of goods and services (the implied guarantees are mandatory); 
(iii) The obligations of manufacturers and suppliers are clearly stated; and 
(iv) The CGA implies mandatory terms into the contract between suppliers 
and consumers, there is no contracting out of the CGA (except where 
goods or services are acquired for business purposes). 
The CGA is designed to regulate the behaviour of suppliers of specified goods 
and services to a consumer. A consumer under the CGA is a person who 
acquires goods or services of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household consumption and does not acquire them for a business purpose.14 
It is important that consumers are protected because of the reasons discussed at 
the beginning of this part of the paper. In particular consumers are normally not 
as informed as a business and low value transactions mean the cost of negotiating 
a contract with all the guarantees of implied by the CGA may be greater than the 
value of.the transaction in most instances. 
By making the terms of the CGA mandatory the Government has increased 
consumer welfare by providing the consumer with some basic contractual terms 
and conditions for the purchase of goods and services. It reduces the transaction 
costs to consumers as they will no longer need to negotiate terms and conditions 
for the supply of goods and services. Consumers will still need to seek advice 
before entering into an agreement to purchase real estate. Real property is not a 
"good" under the CGA. It may be inferred from this that the Government is only 
interested in assisting consumers with purchase of lower value tra11:sactions. This 
would fit with the rationale that the benefit to consumers of enforcing their rights 
14 Section 2 defines service to include rights, benefits, privileges or facilities that are conferred by 
a supplier pursuant to a contract for in relation to the performance of work (including work of a 
professional nature) 
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m lower value transactions is less than the cost of enforcement, and therefore 
consumers require protection. 15 
Part II of the CGA sets out a consumer's rights of redress against a supplier who 
fails to comply with the guarantees implied by the CGA, except for those 
guarantees relating to price and repairs. Depending on the nature and 
circumstances of the defect the consumer is able to have goods repaired, replaced 
or get a refund. 
If a supplier of a service fails to comply with any of the guarantees listed above 
(other than the guarantee regarding price) the consumer may, depending on the 
nature of the failure, require: 
(a) the failure to be remedied, 
(b) the failure to be remedied and recover reasonable costs from the supplier, 
( c) cancellation of the contract, or 
(d) damages for any loss suffered.16 
The consumer's redress for a higher price being charged than what is reasonable 
for the supply of goods or services is not to pay more than a reasonable amount 
for the goods and services. 
By outlining rights of redress in the CGA, and particularly the inclusion of self 
help remedies, for example, requesting that the supplier fixes goods which can be 
repaired in a reasonable time frame , consumers are provided with inexpensive 
access to redress. Consumers do not require a lawyer to be involved while they 
15 
It may also be an indication that consumers that can afford to purchase their own home can 
also afford to look after their own interests. This inference may also be supported by the Credit 
Contract Act 1981, section 15 of the Act defines "controlled credit contracts", the definition 
excludes contracts where the debtor owes the same creditor $250,000 or more. 
16 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, section 32, however , s35 provides that these rules will not 
apply if the performance of the service is merely incidental to the supply of goods and the 
consumer has or had the right to reject the goods. 
• 14 • 
have self help remedies available. This reduces transaction costs to consumers 
and can also increase allocative efficiency. 
Part III of the CGA gives the consumer rights of redress against a manufacturer 
of non-compliant goods due to failure to comply with particular guarantees, 
including the guarantee of repair facilities. 
This is a new statutory right. Without this right the consumer would not be able 
to seek redress from a manufacturer easily, and in any case not in contract. The 
consumer has now been given a statutory right to seek redress from a 
manufacturer which will be useful where the supplier has gone out of business or 
has not been able to provide a satisfactory remedy. 
Therefore while Hon. Katherine O'Regan considered that the CGBill was to 
increase fairness, I consider the CGA has objectives other than increasing 
fairness, it also increases market efficiency by: 
(i) facilitating entry into trades. Consumers do not have to go to the expense 
of negotiating their own contracts for supply which they would often never 
do (except for maybe high value transactions) as the cost and time would out 
way the benefit; and 
(ii) giving consumers a low cost remedy if a vendor fails to meet any of the 
implied guarantees. 
2. Fair Trading Act 1986 
The courts of New Zealand have also followed the United Kingdom m 
developing common law rules around misrepresentations. 
At common law a misstatement which: 
(i) is not simply an expression of opinion but made in such definite terms so 
as to lead the person to whom the statement was made to believe it to be 
true, and 
(ii) on reliance on its veracity, resulted in a contract between the parties, but 
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(iii) was not intended to be a term of the contract when the statement was 
made, 
will give the buyer an opportunity to rescind the contract if the statement was a 
misrepresentation. However, it will not usually give the buyer an opportunity to 
obtain damages unless it was taken as term of the contract, or was made 
fraudulently. 17 
If the statement is not contractual in nature then the remedies at common law are 
more restricted. The recipient of the information may still be able to recover for 
loss resulting from a misrepresentation. 18 Today in New Zealand the Ff A and 
the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 both apply to misrepresentations. The Ff A 
covers all representations and misleading conduct "in trade" and the Contractual 
Remedies Act 1979 deals with misrepresentations that induce the parties to enter 
into a contract. 
The intention of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 was to simplify the existing 
law by reducing the complex network of rules to a few simple principles. 19 That 
Act takes away the distinction of whether a representation was a term of a 
contract or not. However, the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 still causes 
problems for consumers for example, they would have to show they entered into 
a contract on the basis of a misrepresentation.20 
11 Heilbut, Symonds & Co. v Buckleton [1913] AC 30. 
18 If the representation was made recklessly there may be a remedy in tort if _there is a special 
relationship between the parties, if the representation has been made fraudulently, the buyer 
would have a claim in tort for damages in deceit and set the contract aside, if the representation 
was innocent the buyer may be able to rescind the contract in equity however no damages would 
be available. 
19 
Law of Contract, above n 9,293. 
20 Under the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 a consumer will need to show: the representation 
induced the contract (section 6), if the contract is required to have all its terms in writing an oral 
representation will not be enforceable, if the contract is for the sale of goods then it will still be 
important as to whether the misrepresentation is a term as that will impact on whether or not the 
contract can be cancelled. If the court considers it fair and reasonable it may still determine that a 
misrepresentation did not induce the contract if the contract excluded all pre contractual 
- 16 -
Pre 1986 therefore the consumer would usually need to seek legal advice to 
identify their rights and seek compensation for any loss they suffered as a result 
of a misrepresentation. This would increase transaction costs to the consumer 
and often the expense of seeking legal assistance outweighs the value of the 
goods or services purchased. It would mean that suppliers that supplied goods 
and services to consumers would conduct their business largely unchecked 
because individual consumers would often not have the resources to identify and 
enforce their rights. The defects of the existing regulation were identified and 
have been addressed to some extent in the Ff A. 
In 1985 the Fair Trading Bill was introduced to Parliament by the Minister of 
Consumer Affairs, the Hon. Margaret Sheilds. In her introductory speech the 
Minister stated that the Ff A was necessary for the following reasons: 21 
(i) existing legislation was inadequate because it did not set clear standards 
for trade descriptions and trade conduct. No direct remedies were 
available; 
(ii) unfair trade practices such as pyramid selling and bait advertising, 
offering gifts and prizes without intending to supply them, referral 
selling, and demanding or accepting payment without ever intending to 
supply all needed to be prohibited; 
(iii) to prescribe product safety; 
(iv) to ban hazardous goods; 
(v) to give access to effective remedies; 
(vi) to consolidate the law; 
(vii) to align New Zealand law with Australia; 
(viii) to educate consumers on their rights and remedies; and 
representations. It does not assist a consumer who suffered a loss but did not enter into a contract 
with the representer. 
21 (7 November 1985), NZPD, 467, 11985 
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(ix) to benefit fair and ethical suppliers in relation to unfair competition that 
results from deceptive advertising and other conduct. 
In her introductory speech for the Ff A Margaret Shields stated: 22 
The Bill is the corollary of the Commerce Bill ... That Bill promotes workable and 
effective competition in the markets in New Zealand. This Bill is designed to ensure 
that consumers, as participants in the market place participate in the benefits of 
competition by countering deceptive conduct and promoting informed choice in the key 
areas of price, quality and service, and ensuring that consumers have accurate 
comparative information on which to base their purchasing decisions. 
The Ff A came into effect on 1 March 1987. Its long title states the Ff A is " ... an 
Act to prohibit certain conduct and practices in trade to provide for the disclosure 
of consumer information and to promote safety." 
Under the FT A the Commerce Commission is given the task of making 
information about the Ff A available for persons in trade and for consumers. This 
is new obligation that did not exist prior to the Ff A. The goal of this provision is 
to assist consumers to discover their rights without requiring the consumers to 
pay for legal advice. This obligation reduces transaction costs to the consumer by 
giving them information about their rights, who the consumer can complain to, 
and the type of remedies that may be available. 
Part I of the Ff A prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct, false 
representations and unfair market practices "in trade" . Part I contains a general 
prohibition on engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct, or conduct that is 
likely to mislead or deceive.23 There are other more specific prohibitions 
regarding misleading conduct in relation to goods, services and employment. 
Those more specific prohibitions also carry with them criminal liability.
24 
Section 13 prohibits particular false statements about goods and services and 
section 14 prohibits specified false statements about land. The balance of Part I 
22 NZPD 467 , above n 22. 
23 Fair Trading Act 1986, Section 9 
24 Fair Trading Act 1986, Section 40 
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prohibits certain unfair practice (that is offering of prizes without the intention of 
providing them, bait advertising, pyramid selling, harassment and coercion and 
referral selling (offering a consumer some benefit in return for the consumer 
giving that person the names of prospective customers or otherwise assisting that 
person to supply goods and services to other consumers), if the benefit is 
contingent on an event occurring after that contract is made). 
The FT A is different to the CGA in that it applies to all transactions, including 
land, entered into by both businesses and consumers. However, it is similar in an 
important way, a supplier cannot contract out of its obligations under the FTA. 
The FT A, like the CGA, implies mandatory terms into dealings between a 
consumer and a supplier. This is important for consumers because it redresses 
the imbalance of power between a large supplier and a consumer, as the 
consumer does not need to take any steps to affirm or retain their rights by 
seeking agreement of the supplier. Part one itself doesn't add much for the 
consumer as it is a restatement of the existing law, and doesn't do much to clarify 
the pre existing issues such whether silence constitutes a misrepresentation, 
(though the use of the phrase "misleading conduct" may make it more likely that 
a silence will be actionable). 
Parts II and III of the FT A deal with information that must be disclosed about 
particular products and product safety standards (including the compulsory recall . 
of products in certain circumstances) respectively. Section 33 makes it illegal to 
import goods that do not comply with the product safety provisions of the FTA. 
Part IV deals with the safety of services. Services for the purposes of this part 
includes the performance of work by way of maintenance and repair, treatment 
or alteration of goods, transportation of goods, maintenance and the development 
of land and buildings. 
Parts II, III and IV are a restatement of existing regulations and legislation that 
has been consolidated in the one Act by the FT A. 
Part V specifies the remedies. The remedies are not as simple for consumers to 
enforce as under the CGA. Sections 40 to 43 set out the range of orders that can 
be made from criminal conviction for breaches of certain sections to injunctions, 
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fines, damages and other orders remedying damage caused by the breach. The 
Commerce Commission has the power to bring an action against parties in 
breach. 
Part V of the FT A is helpful to consumers as it gives the courts a guide as to 
what remedies they can award a consumer. Further by giving the Commerce 
Commission the power to enforce the FT A action can be taken against suppliers 
that engage in unfair trade practices before consumers suffer any loss or where 
consumers have suffered loss but cannot afford to take an action, to prevent 
further customer's incurring loss. 
The FT A was to achieve further objectives other than consumer protection, 
including aligning New Zealand' s laws with those of Australia, consolidating 
New Zealand's law in the area, and set clear standards for trade conduct. The 
FT A goes someway towards setting clear standards for trade practices, by 
making the standards mandatory, however as mentioned above, it does not 
address the issue of silence. The FT A has also caused issues because a consumer 
would need to show the conduct was "in trade". I do not consider that the FT A 
has consolidated New Zealand's law as much as it could because the FTA adds 
to obligations of suppliers it does not replace them. 
Both the CGA and the FT A provide a summary of consumers existing rights 
however they both add two important, additional features they cannot be 
contracted out of and they defin~ the remedies that are available to the consumer. 
The FT A also allows the Commerce Commission to take an action against an 
errant supplier. 
The comparatively low value of consumer transactions impacts on consumers in 
two ways; firstly the cost of enforcing their rights is often too high compared to 
the cost of the goods and services. Secondly a supplier will not have the same 
incentive to negotiate terms of a contract with a consumer which does not 
represent a high revenue stream. Therefore mandatory terms reduce the 
transaction costs to the consumer. 
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B Government Policy of Consumer Protection 
The underlying theory of consumer protection regulation has been written about 
widely. Government policy driving consumer protection 1s 
recommended/developed by the Ministry of Consumer Affairs. The Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs was established in furtherance of the Labour Government's 
1984 election policy of taking steps to improve consumer welfare.25 The Ministry 
of Consumer Affairs is an operating branch of the Ministry of Economic 
Development. The relationship between the two Ministries is documented from 
time to time in a Relationship Letter, which is agreed by the head of each 
Ministry.26 The services that the Ministry provides are: 27 
(i) Advising Government on regulation and self regulation of consumer 
markets, 
(ii) The provision of information, education and advice that helps consumers 
and businesses to understand and use consumer legislation, 
(iii) Advising on product safety issues; and 
(iv) The administration of trade measurement in New Zealand. 
Within the Ministry, the Consumer Policy Advice Unit is responsible for policy 
advice on laws relating to consumer transactions, market place regulation and· 
self- regulation. 
The Ministry has published a number of policy papers. These state that its 
objectives are to remove the impediments to voluntary transactions and to 
minimise the cost of transactions between consumers and businesses. Keith 
Manch (General Manager, Ministry of Consumer Affairs) has written that the 
25 As advised by Pamela Rogers, Advisor, Ministry of Consumer Affairs (24 August 2000). 
26 The Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Overview of the Ministry of Consumer affairs, (Wellington, 
November 1999), Appendix A, [ Overview of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs]. 
27 Overview of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n26. 
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desire to minimise the cost of transactions, in the broadest sense, fundamentally 
underpins the Ministry's work. 28 
In October 1996, Keith Manch wrote; "The Ministry of Consumer Affairs exists 
to promote a fair and informed market place for consumers."29 
The Ministry of Consumer Affairs' key objectives are, in summary, to increase 
market efficiency and to increase fairness. The Ministry has concluded that; "The 
main driving force behind the process of making law or regulation in consumer 
markets is the creation and maintenance of efficient markets in which the 
legitimate rights of consumers are reflected."30 
These objectives are, the Ministry says, in pursuance of the political vision in 
New Zealand that is currently that voluntary transactions are preferable to 
transactions resulting from government directions. 31 
The Ministry's own view of its role has been reinforced by the view of 
commentators. Professor John Burrows32 reasons that due to the change in the 
nature of products which are now being offered, consumers are not able to use 
their own judgment to ascertain the quality or suitability of the goods or services 
that they are purchasing. As a result, consumers have formed interest groups (I 
suggest that these interest groups provide a common perspective on equality, that 
is, what criteria is used to discriminate between groups of people based on · 
fairness arguments). Burrows continues and states that governments have formed 
organisations to care for the consumer such as the Ministry of Consumer Affairs. 
He also comments that in economic theory the consumer is the sovereign of the 
28 The Economic Context of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above nl, i,(Foreward). 
29 Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Assessing Costs and Benefits in Consumer Policy Development 
(Wellington, October 1996),i, (Forward},[Assessing Costs and Benefits in Consumer Policy}. 
30 Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Market Self Regulation and Codes of Practice, (Wellington, 
1997), 2, [Market Self Regulation]. 
31 The Economic Impact of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above, nl, 1. 
32 Law of Contract, above n9, 26. 
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market place (a view shared by the Ministry of Consumer Affairs
33), but 
concludes that this can only happen with Government intervention. 
If the Government did not intervene in the market, the market can, where 
possible, respond to a market failure and unfairness. In this case the market 
might respond by: 
(i) consumers forgoing the transaction; 
(ii) a consumer could inspect the goods themselves, however this does 
increase transaction costs but could be expected in the purchase of a large 
asset (as assumed by the CGA by the exclusion of transactions for land); 
(iii) a consumer may ask friends (other consumers) what their experience of 
the product and vendor has been; 
(iv) Sellers and manufacturers could guarantee their products, however these 
may not meet the customer's expectations and there is no incentive on a 
seller to offer a guarantee unless the market is competitive; 
(v) Consumer may develop brand loyalty. The consumer can by a brand that 
they have tried and liked before, and not take the risk of trying an 
unproven brand. (This, taken to the extreme, will raise the barriers to 
entry to new players in markets, as they will need to invest heavily in. 
advertising and marketing to gain market share. This will have an anti 
competitive effect in long term and therefore reduce the consumer's 
choice). 
(vi) Independent organisations may test products or recon:imend sellers. 
However this does have free rider problems and there is an argument that 
all the information should be available in a perfectly competitive market 
in any case. The reality today is that there are so many goods and 
services available on the market today of varying technical detail that 
even if the information was available the consumer may not be able to 
33 Market Self Regulation, above n 30,4. 
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understand or get hold of it. Consumer advice web sites are beginning to 
make significant in roads in addressing the information gap. 
The Ministry of Consumer Affairs suggests that market based solutions have a 
number of drawbacks: 34 
(i) generally they are reactive, 
(ii) they lack compulsion 
(iii) not all traders are bound or elect to provide them 
(iv) no provision for redress when a trader will not accept being bound, 
(v) firms that fail through poor product or service quality generally take their 
customer's down with them. (firms may be allowed to perform poorly for 
a long time before market sanctions force the firm to go out of business, 
causing a reduction in social welfare). 
Because of these drawbacks, the Ministry considers that there is a need to 
legislate 'to move our markets to an efficient state. The Ministry has identified the 
following five characteristics that it considers necessary for a perfectly 
competitive market: 35 
(i) free and equal access to markets, 
(ii) interchangeable commodities available from many sellers, 
(iii) buyers have perfect knowledge, 
(iv) no one party has sufficient power to unilaterally determine price, quality 
or performance ; and 
(v) all costs of providing the commodity are borne by the producer and all 
the benefits accrue to the consumer. 
34 Market Self-Regulation, above n 30, 4. 
35 Market Self Regulation , above n 30, 2. 
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In the same paper the Ministry cites four instances where a consumer may have 
difficulty exercising his sovereignty: 
(i) supplier is a monopoly 
(ii) externalities are not reflected in the market prices 
(iii) information asymmetries exist 
(iv) transaction costs are excessive 
These are known in economic terms as "market failures". The list of difficulties 
is not exhaustive, however. It does not include non-rival or public goods. These 
are goods which are not unique (or non- excludable) and are not diminished by 
use. In these instances the consumer will not be offered the product in the 
market due to lack of demand, not because the consumer does not want or value 
the product but because once the product is produced the consumer can free ride 
(that is, get the benefit of the good without paying for it). 
The Ministry of Consumer Affairs has concluded that to achieve an efficient 
market, its goal is to minimise the cost of transactions between consumers and 
business. 36 
Transaction costs include three subcategories:
37 
(i) pre transaction costs, which include search and information costs 
(including the costs of labelling and advertising), 
(ii) contemporaneous transaction costs, which include the costs of agreeing 
the deal; and 
(iii) post transaction costs, which include the cost of enforcing contracted 
rights and seeking a remedy. 
36 The Economic Context of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above nl, i (Foreward), (Keith 
Manch). 
31The Economic Context of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above nl, 17-18. 
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In some transactions where the consumer is in a strong position (for example, the 
purchase of groceries which the consumer has the opportunity to inspect), the 
transaction costs are non-existent or minimal. I suggest that, in this situation, the 
consumer will be more concerned with paying as little as possible and the seller 
will want to obtain as much as possible for the products sold, therefore there will 
be a strong case to leave regulation to the market. 
The CGA and the FT A are evidence of where the Government has used 
regulatory tools to reduce transaction costs to the consumer, for example the 
mandatory terms of the FT A and the CGA reduce contemporaneous transactions 
costs and by stating the available remedies post transaction costs are reduced. 
Both Acts also can be used to reduce pre transaction costs by giving the 
consumer the right be able to rely on a recommendation or information given by 
the supplier about the goods or services they wish to purchase. 
The Government divines the jurisdiction over which it has sovereignty from 
geographical boundaries. Therefore, while the Government can establish policy 
to guide·. regulation of consumer protection domestically, with the increasingly 
global nature of markets, the Government may also need to consider whether or 
not the objectives of the policy will be met through domestic regulation. If not 
then the Government will need to look at international initiatives and decide 
whether it wants to harmonise its consumer protection laws with that of other 
jurisdictions. This has policy implications of its own which are not the focus of 
this paper but will need to be considered in parallel with consumer protection 
policy and more importantly the tools chosen to implement it. Jurisdictional 
issues will be discussed in more detail later in this paper. 
The type of regulation that the Government will consider implementing to 
achieve its policy and goals, will depend on a number factors which include the 
nature of the goods and services, the desirability of the transaction, the effect on 
other markets, and most importantly whether or not any proposed regulation will 
be effective. I will discuss the particular tools for regulation available to the 
Government below. 
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C Tools for Regulation 
Regulation is a way of changing people's behaviour. Lawrence Lessig identifies 
four modalities (ways of regulating to modify behaviour):
38 
(i) Law. This is the most obvious modalility. It is directed by government 
and orders people to behave in a certain way or face the threat of 
punishment. The legislature enacts, the prosecutors threaten and the 
courts convict; 
(ii) Social norms. These are directed by the community we live in and dictate 
how we conduct ourselves in public and to a lesser extent in private. 
Social norms also regulate by threatening punishment, not though, 
through a centralised force but by the community. The community 
regulates, the community threatens and the community punishes. Social 
norms will effect what objects are traded and may reflect a prevailing 
definition of fairness. 
(iii) Markets. These regulate by price. In an efficient market the consumer 
will determine the price. Markets are only able to constrain in this way 
because of other constraints of law and social norms; property rights and 
contract law govern markets , and markets operate within the domain 
permitted by social norms. Markets will affect how easy or difficult it is· 
to change architecture. 
(iv) Architecture/ Nature. Architecture is the physical world as we find it. If a 
river separates two cities there are limits on the way the citizens of those 
cities will interact. A high wall and barbed wire will prevent the people 
crossing over it. Architecture will affect the development of norms. 
Lessig points out that these four modalities act together to regulate behaviour. It 
is the mix of these modalities that will determine the effectiveness of the 
regulation. Social norms, markets and architecture will all influence law. In this 
38 Lawrence Lessig, "The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach", (1999) 113:501, 
Harv I Rev, 501, 522-533. 
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part I am going to focus on how law may effect markets, architecture and social 
norms. I consider separately the tools that are available for regulation 
domestically and internationally. 
I. Tools for domestic regulation 
I have already discussed the Ff A and the CGA, two key pieces of legislation that 
underpin consumer protection in market transactions. These two pieces of 
legislation incorporate a number of tools listed below which are available to the 
Government to intervene in markets. 
The Ministry of Consumer Affairs has identified a range of tools that may be 
used to achieve its objective of increasing market efficiency. The Ministry has 
also published guidelines, within which issues are defined, scoped and options 
considered and selected. 39 
Government regulation can take many forms for example: 
(i) ~tate ownership. The state will provide goods and services that are 
public goods such as defence and police. The state will often provide 
goods and services that are natural monopolies. In New Zealand the 
policy has been away from Government participation as a seller in a 
market. 
(ii) State allocation. The Government may allocate scarce resources to 
participants in the market based on a set of pre determined criteria. This 
may be done through the use of licenses and quotas (for example fishing 
quota). 
(iii) Limited property rights. The government may give a person the right to 
use property for a specified time or in a specified way. For example 
intellectual property rights are both regulate the rights of the creator and 
any other party. Licenses and permits may be used to give rights to 
people to use property for a particular purpose but not necessarily to 
39 Assessing the Cost and Benefits in Consumer Policy, above n 29 . 
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dispose of it. Property rights are also limited by restricting the design and 
construction of the property, for example physical structures must comply 
with the Building Act and the Resource Management Act and cars must 
pass a Warrant of Fitness in accordance with the Land Transport Act. 
(iv) State approval of certain contracts_ This can be used to prevent 
companies gaining undesirable market dominance_ 
(v) Mandatory terms. · The imposition of mandatory terms can be used to 
give certainty to consumers in low value transactions where the cost of 
negotiating terms would be higher than the value of the transaction and 
where there is an imbalance of power between the parties, for example 
refer to the CGA and FT A discussed above. 
(vi) Default remedies/ penalties. Default remedies in certain contracts give 
the consumer self help remedies which they do not require court sanction 
to enforce therefore reducing transaction costs, (for example see the CGA 
and the Companies Act 1992 (minority interests)). Default penalties have 
the same effect. For example, section 25 of the Credit Contracts Act 
1981 provides that the penalty on the financier for not making proper 
disclosure will result in the debtor not being required to pay the specified 
amount. 
(vii) Restrict who may enter into a transaction. For example, a minor may not 
enter into a contract unless particular criteria are fulfilled (Minors 
Contracts Act 1969. Some classes of people are also prohibited from 
engaging as a seller in various markets (for example, the Credit Contracts 
Act 1981 prohibits certain classes of people from acting as 'financiers). 
(viii) Facilitating credible commitments. By providing a body of contract law 
parties can enter into agreements which enable one party to receive the 
benefit of the agreement later than the other. This reduces transaction 
costs as parties can often avoid going to court if the outcome is 
predictable, but also gives parties access to the courts (or other quasi 
judicial institutions) to enforce their rights. 
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(ix) Providing default rules for common transactions. These are rules that 
may be contracted out of and are aimed at reducing transaction costs and 
can be found in the Sale of Goods Act 1908 and the Companies Act 1993. 
These are not found so much at the consumer end of the market. These 
are less likely to found in consumer protection legislation today, but tend 
to be used to facilitate business transactions. 
(x) Prohibiting and imposing sanctions for various forms of deceptive or 
misleading conduct. This technique is used to increase allocative 
efficiency in markets and requires the sellers to tell the truth. This has 
been discussed earlier in terms of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 and 
the FfA. 
(xi) Prohibiting activities that distort the operation of markets. Collusion, 
abuse of dominant market positions, onerous contracts and other unfair 
trade practices all go to distort price, quality and quantity of goods and 
services. For example the Commerce Act 1986 regulates these activities 
in New Zealand. 
(xii) Requiring disclosure m certain matters, m the context of certain 
transactions, to address information asymmetries. These are rules that 
require the seller to disclose information about the product, investment or 
themselves. This is a tool that may be used to increase allocative 
efficiency and to decrease transaction costs. In theory, the information 
will be readily accessible to the seller and therefore the search cost to the 
seller will be lower than they would be for the buyer. 
(xiii) Making provision for dispute resolution. Institutions have the important 
function of enforcing obligations that are imposed between the parties or 
by statute. In New Zealand the courts and the Disputes Tribunal provide 
dispute resolution forums. In addition to these bodies are self regulating 
bodies such as the New Zealand Law Society, which is a statutory body 
that hears complaints of consumers of legal services at the NZLS 
Disciplinary Tribunal. 
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(xiv) Requiring market participants that wish to trade in particular goods and 
services to be authorised or licensed. This will enable transaction costs to 
be reduced by reducing search costs. This type of intervention requires a 
minimum level of competency and in many cases subjects the seller to 
industry regulation. 
(xv) Establishing institutions to monitor and regulate particular markets/ self 
regulation. This form of regulation delegates powers of regulation to 
industry and professional groups or to Government bodies. It should 
enable more effective and flexible regulation by empowering experts to 
identify the areas of risk and enforce an industry best practice and code of 
ethics thus increasing quality, for example, the Securities Commission. 
(xvi) Educating consumers. This has been delegated to various government 
bodies by statute and through policy. For example, the Commerce 
Commission has been delegated responsibility for educating the public 
about the FT A. The Ministry of Consumer Affairs provides a public 
information office and helpline which people can contact to obtain advice 
about market issues. 
(xvii) Exclusion from market transaction. In New Zealand there are very few 
examples of activities that are prohibited completely. It is suggested that 
those transactions that are prohibited tend to be so for the following 
reasons: 
1. prevent commodification (for example, the sale of babies or body 
parts) 
2. paternalism (for example mmors cannot enter into m normal 
circumstances, some products or services may be seen to be "bad" 
and therefore prohibited) 
The Government also has another tool, to do nothing, to leave it to the market 
and social norms to regulate behaviour. This will be effective if there is 
sufficient competition in the market or if there are enough, relatively low cost 
private organisation's assisting the consumer. 
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2. Tools for International Harmonisation of Law 
I will not consider the question of harmonisation of laws in depth, as it could be 
the subject of a paper in its own right. However it necessary to discuss some of 
the issues briefly in this paper because new communication technologies make 
global transactions much more accessible to consumers. As a result domestic 
regulation alone may not be sufficient to protect consumers. 
The issues for consumers transacting across jurisdictions anse from the 
uncertainty of the existing law. When a transaction takes place in more than one 
country or state, potentially the laws of all states could apply. This is called a 
conflict of laws. How the conflict will be resolved will be different in each state. 
Broadly the issues that a court would need to decide on are: 
(a) Whether the court can exercise jurisdiction; 
(b) Whether the court will exercise jurisdiction; 
(c) Choice of law; and 
( d) Enforcement of foreign judgments. 
At common law the New Zealand High Court will have basic jurisdiction over a 
person resident overseas and events occurring extraterritorially if the damage is 
sustained in New Zealand.
40 In other circumstances it will depend on whether or 
not the High Court will exercise its discretion to allow the defendant to be 
served. High Court Rules 219 and 220 outline in which circumstances the court 
may consider granting leave for service.
41 
40 Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Thompson [1971] AC 458, discussed by the New Zealand 
Law Commission in, A Guide for the Legal and Business Community: R50, (Wellington, 
1998),92- 97. 
41 The District Court has jurisdiction through the District Courts Act 1947. The District Court 
has basic jurisdiction in civil matters up to a value or $200,000. Up to that limit in civil matters 
the District court will therefore have the same jurisdiction of the High Court (District Court 
Rules 242- 243 mirror the High Court with respect to service). 
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Even if the court finds it has jurisdiction it may not exercise that jurisdiction if it 
is considered that it is forum non-conveniens. The approach of various states in 
addressing the issue of basic jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction differs and 
therefore a successful outcome for a consumer in one jurisdiction may not 
impact on the result in another jurisdiction. 
Even after the consumer has managed to satisfy the court that it does have 
jurisdiction and that the court should exercise that jurisdiction the next step is to 
satisfy the court that the laws of New Zealand should apply. If the parties have 
selected New Zealand law in the contract then the courts will give effect to that 
unless there are overriding public policy reasons not to . If no system of law has 
been chosen then it will be determined on the application of New Zealand's 
choice of law rules . Whether or not New Zealand law will be applied is difficult 
to predict. If the court decides that the law of another jurisdiction will apply 
then the parties will need to produce evidence of that other state' s law in the 
hearing. This will add further expense to the consumer' s case. 
The final hurdle for the consumer is to get any remedy they are awarded 
enforced in a foreign jurisdiction. This will mean a further application has to be 
made, this time to the court in the jurisdiction in which the consumer wants the 
order to be enforced. 
The existing regulation will act to increase transaction costs to consumers 
because of the uncertainty they cause. 
There are is a range of ways New Zealand may harmonise its law with the laws 
of other states, for example: 
(i) by enacting domestic laws which are the same as the law of another 
state. An example of this that I have already discussed is the Ff A, 
(ii) agree bilateral arrangements as occur between New Zealand and 
Australia pursuant to CER; and 
(iii) contributing to and be party to multilateral arrangements or treaties . 
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The principal sources of international law are treaties, international custom, 
judicial decisions, and academic writings.42 The Law Commission describes a 
treaty as: 43 
A treaty is an international agreement between two or more states or other international 
persons, governed by international law. ('other international persons include bodies such 
as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the South Pacific Commission'). 
Treaties can be used to: 
(i) harmonise current consumer protection laws; 
(ii) establish new laws; 
(iii) unify choice of law rules; and 
(iv) unify rules of jurisdiction. 
When a country signs a treaty it may reqmre the signatory country to enact 
particular legislation domestically and may have an effect on the development of 
legislation in general. 
The particular value of treaties is that they can be used to reduce transaction costs 
to consumers. Consumers will find it costly and time consuming to enforce their 
rights at law in New Zealand, against foreign suppliers. Treaties may eliminate 
issues over jurisdiction by either containing jurisdiction clauses or by conforming 
laws enough that jurisdiction will not have an effect on the outcome of a dispute. 
Treaties have drawbacks however: 
(i) it takes a long time to create and ratify a treaty (Berne Convention was 
first adopted in 1886 and in 1919 (30 years later) only 15 of the 133 states 
which have ratified the treaty had joined.), 
42 Article 38( 1), Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
43 New Zealand Law Commission, A New Zealand Guide to International Law and its Sources: 
R34, (May 1996, Wellington), 6. 
- 34 -
(ii) difficult to create because it 1s difficult to reach consensus between 
national powers, 
(iii) they are costly; and 
(iv) they are inflexible. 
Whether or not New Zealand should agree to align its laws with other nations 
depends on a number of factors including: 44 
(i) the extent that it is necessary to address a market failure, 
(ii) the extent to which diversity will promote competition, 
(iii) differences in commercial or regulatory environment (for example, if a 
country does not have the resources or skills to enforce a law 
harmonisation will be ineffective); and 
(iv) participation and accountability (the law making is removed further from 
those that must abide by it, this may reduce the quality and effectiveness 
of the law), costs of co-ordination. 
However, despite these drawbacks, if an issue cannot be effectively regulated 
domestically then the Government may need to find a multilateral solution that 
will work. 
3. Choice of Tools 
The Government could use any one or a combination of the tools listed above to 
regulate for consumer protection. What is appropriate may vary depending on the 
product or service and the identified market failure. When considering the 
options the Ministry of Consumer Affairs has identified several factors that 
should be considered, including: 45 
44 David Goddard, "Making Business Law: the CER Dimension", (August 1999, Wellington) . 
45 Assessing the Cost and Benefits in Consumer Policy Development, above n 29, 8 
' 
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(i) Constraints in the way of Government policy directives and resources. 
For example the current Government policy is towards voluntary 
transactions therefore state ownership is now a tool which is not used to 
the extent that it once was, if at all; 
(ii) Contribution to existing policy, for example, will the proposed use of the 
tool reduce transaction costs? Will it distort the market? 
(iii) Education may be the solution not further regulation or in addition to 
further regulation; 
(iv) Implementation and compliance. Are the resources required for 
enforcement realistic? How will compliance be enforced? (This is of 
particular concern when transactions in a particular market occur across 
national borders). 
(v) Avoid stifling innovation; 
(vi) -y/hat are the costs of the solution, when will they be incurred and who 
bears the cost? 
(vii) Who will get the benefit of the solution, will the benefits change over 
time? 
(viii) What is the effect on the ability on the consumer to participate in the 
market? and 
(ix) What incentives will be created? 
The Ministry of Consumer Affairs has declared that self regulation has become 
the key initiative to ensure improved market practices driven largely because of 
the increasingly global economy.46 The Ministry of Consumer Affairs has 
compiled a list of instances where, while Government regulation may provide 
46 Market Self Regulation, above n 30, !,(Foreword). 
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effective overarching controls on market behaviour, self-regulation may provide 
a more efficient outcome. These instances are: 47 
(i) Where only a segment of the market 1s affected and over arching 
Government legislation is unlikely to occur. 
(ii) Where the objective is to promote compliance with over arching 
Government regulation within a particular market sector, for example the 
Securities Commission has developed regulations to ensure that the 
Securities Act 1978 is complied with. 
(iii) Within a particular market sector there is widespread acknowledgement 
of the need for and commitment to, the development of controls to 
improve trading standards. For example trade associations such as 
builder's guilds. 
(iv) The objective is to provide customer focused benefits beyond the 
minimum standards provided by the law. For example a code of practice. 
To begiri to understand what the policy considerations might be with respect to 
protecting consumers trading on line. I will look at the features of the Internet 
and how the Internet is used today. 
IV. THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 
A The Architecture of the Inte_rnet 
The Internet is an open platform, network of computers. It allows geographically 
diverse entities to communicate and transact almost instantaneously. The 
architecture of the Internet provides opportunity for great gains in efficiency in 
global markets but it also poses problems for consumers. 
Communication over the Internet occurs by the message being broken up into 
packets and reassembled. Special Internet protocols are attached to each part of 
the message which tags where the message is to be sent and in what order it is to 
47 Market Self Regulation, above n 30. 
- 37 -
be recompiled. The message then gets sent either over a network of wire or 
transmitted using wireless technology. The message can be sent through various 
parts of the network, through one of potentially millions of alternative routes that 
can carry a message anywhere in the world that is also connected to the Internet. 
There is no centralised system that the message has to go through, the Internet is 
decentralised. 
No one person or country 1s responsible for maintaining and monitoring the 
whole of the Internet. Potentially anyone who has access to the relevant 
technology can use the Internet. Portals to the Internet are becoming more 
diverse and now the Internet can be accessed without the need for a person to 
own a computer. Mobile phones, cyber cafes and kiosks may also be used to 
access the Internet and the number of devices is increasing all the time. 
Because of the architecture of the Internet there are many potential benefits to 
consumers and the economy, for example: 
(i) The decentralised nature of the Internet gives consumers easy and cost-
effective access to the global market. This gives consumers greater 
choice of products, price and quality, including greater customisation of 
products to suit the consumer's preferences; 
(ii) Due to the speed of communication, companies can lower inventory· 
levels, shorten supply times, simplify the order process, and shorten 
product cycles. The consumer will reap the benefits of these lower costs 
through lower prices; 
(iii) Consumers will be able to access the suppliers directly without the need 
for intermediaries; 
(iv) Lower transaction costs, greater access to information and potentially 
more competitors due to lower barriers to entry will move the market 
closer to perfect competition; 
(v) The opportunities for customisation and the variety of products and 
services which may be offered at a lower cost may increase global 
productivity and economic growth; 
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(vi) The Internet may enhance welfare because of easier access to 
information, greater convenience and greater specificity of products; and 
(vii) The decentralised nature of the Internet encourages innovation and 
maximises personal freedom. 
The more people and businesses that use the Internet the more valuable the 
Internet will be to the other users. As a community of users develop that can 
share information and enter into transactions with each other, more opportunities 
are created to transact and share information. This results in an exponential 
growth in value that is called "the network effect". However more people using 
the Internet consequently increases the risks to those that use it. The architecture 
of the Internet that provides the benefits also provides opportunities for problems 
for consumers in particular. Because of the architecture of the Internet and the 
uncertainty how the existing law will apply to Internet transactions Consumers 
may find that they are exposed to new risks when they enter into transactions on 
line. 
(a) The integrity of the network 
There are at least two possible issues which consumers may face due to the 
Internet ' s diverse routing, lack of centralised control and the open platform. The 
first is that it gives hackers the opportunity to intercept information sent over the· 
Internet. It has been reported that actual credit card fraud has increased since the 
increase in popularity of the Internet.48 However the reason has not been breach 
of network security as credit card numbers are being obtained by traditional 
methods . It is the unauthorised use of credit card numbers over the Internet that 
is increasing fraud. 
48 Consumers should not be overly concerned with credit card fraud, currently at least. When an 
unauthorised transaction occurs the bank first tries to recover the money back from the merchant, 
if the merchant cannot repay the money the bank will take the loss .. The consumer can also ask 
for amounts to be charged back to their credit card where a merchant has failed to deliver goods 
which have been paid for in advance. (This approach is not consistent with that of eftpos 
transaction and PIN numbers). 
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The second issue is that because the network is so vast the quality of all the parts 
of the network, (for example, servers, telephone line infrastructure and switches) 
cannot be guaranteed. This may cause connection delays, failures or the 
opportunity for security of the communication to be breached. This may impact 
on the timing of receipt of critical information such as; information on 
investments, acceptance and withdrawal of acceptance of an offer. 
" (b) Anonymity 
This potentially has issues for consumers when contracting on line with vendors, 
currently consumers cannot easily confirm: 
(a) the existence of the party they are contracting with; 
(b) any relevant qualifications or licenses which may be necessary to 
engage in a particular transaction; 
(c) the nationality of the entity they are contracting with; or 
(d) whether the vendor has the capacity to contract. 
In the physical world a consumer can apply their own personal criteria to assess 
whether the service provider is legitimate. Consumers may also be able to 
identify a person in the future to provide evidence of that person's identity 
should any action be brought ·· against that person for fraud. There is more 
incentive on people to be honest in the physical world when they can be 
identified, even if it only through forensic evidence, that is, social norms may not 
be such a strong regulator in cyberspace. 
In summary the issues are related to identity and jurisdiction. Consumers who 
cannot identify the party with whom they have contracted will not be able to 
enforce the contract. In some jurisdictions, New Zealand being one of them, 
there may be a prohibition on particular entities entering into certain transactions. 
For example, in New Zealand minors cannot enter into contracts and only certain 
licensed entities may sell particular goods or services. 
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(c) Flexibility 
Flexibility may be an issue for consumers from an evidential perspective in so far 
as transacting on the Internet is concerned. A vendor is able to change the 
information on web pages as and when it pleases therefore a consumer will have 
to ensure they print a copy of the information they are relying on when entering 
into a transaction on line. Examples of the types of information that may be 
necessary to print are the terms and conditions of any contracts that the vendor 
will be bound by and any statements made regarding the quality of goods and 
services to be supplied. 
(d) Hyperlinks 
Hyperlinks are an example of a tool that vendors may use when constructing 
their web sites. Hyperlinks can be used within a document, web site or between 
web sites. They can be useful in that they provide rapid cross -referencing but 
they may potentially provide the consumer with problems. Improper use of 
hyperlin_ks may give the appearance of legitimacy to otherwise non- legitimate 
information. Put simply, the existence of a hyperlink may be construed to imply 
an endorsement by the owner of the site that the illegitimate site is hyperlinking. 
(e) Interactivity 
Interactive web sites that contain, for example, options to pay electronically or 
send an order to trade shares allow consumers to effect a transaction 
instantaneously. Such an environment, however, could increase the temptation 
for a consumer to react impulsively and make less reactive investment or 
purchasing decisions. It maybe that such actions could cause market over 
reactions or worse a market failure. In the physical world this may still be an 
issue but in cyberspace information can travel more widely and more quickly and 
therefore the effects of that information will be more widespread and occur more 
quickly. 
(f) Privacy 
The Internet makes it very easy to collect, store and manipulate information 
about consumers. While this may have some benefit to the consumer, the 
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technology is such that the consumer will often never know information is being 
cached. This subverts the consumer's ability to regulate the use of information 
about themselves. 
(g) Control of the architecture 
Lessig has identified that consumers (and the public in general), may encounter 
issues with the Internet, because they do not understand the impact of the 
Architecture on them. Code writers can manipulate consumers and digital 
environment. 49 
The first is limited access to intellectual property. This problem is an example of 
how technology may be used to alter the range of products available to 
consumers. The idea is that if each of the rights attaching to a piece of 
intellectual property could be unbundled then each piece could be sold 
separately. For example if a book was sold it could be sold to read once only, it 
could be sold to read an unlimited number of times but so that it could not be lent 
to anyone else, or it could be sold with all rights attaching to it. This may of 
course have some advantages to consumers as they will only need to purchase 
(and pay for) the rights the consumer values. However Lessig is concerned that 
the benefit of all ideas will be protected beyond that which is allowed at law, 
therefore reducing the benefits to society. 
The second issue is where the code writer assumes sovereignty. Lessig likens 
code constraints to contracts; ''The code writer operates free of the implicit 
limitations of contract law, he or she can construct an alternative regime for 
enforcing voluntary constraints. ,,so 
Lessig' s point is that in real space the enforcement of a contract is determined 
either by agreement between the parties or by a court. In cyberspace the code 
writer can use code to enforce the terms of the contract whether or not they 
would be found to be enforceable at law. The consumer will have no opportunity 
49 Lawrence Lessig, above n38. 
so Lawrence Lessig, above n 38, 529. 
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to question the enforcement. Public values will then not have an opportunity to 
enter the mix as they do when legislation is being passed or when an issue is 
considered by the courts. 
B Internet Usage 
Generally the Internet can be used to collect information, communicate with 
friends, colleagues and customers and to enter into transactions. The Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs completed a status report on electronic commerce and the New 
Zealand Consumer in March 2000.51 The Report shows that New Zealanders 
have spent NZ$242 million on Internet shopping in the past year.52 It is 
predicted that by 2004 New Zealanders will spend US$2.7 billion on business 
and personal transactions, with the Internet user population growing from 
393,000 as at January 2000, to 1.9 million in 2004. Statistics published on 10 
February 2000 by the International Data Corp (IDC) predicted that by the end of 
2000 the number of users would be 1.14 million53(this figure has subsequently 
been revised down to under lmillion). 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics published a report in 1999 which reported 
that the majority of items purchased on line were books, magazines, computer 
software, music and tickets. The Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2000 has 
quoted that the number of business to consumer (B2C) transactions are purchases 
of less than $300.00. 54 This may suggest that consumers do not yet trust the 
medium for high value transactions. I have found no further evidence however 
that this is because of the Internet specifically, it may be that mail order 
transactions and other forms of distance selling are also restricted to relatively 
51 Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Electronic Commerce and the New Zealand Consumer, A Status 
Report and a Proposed New Zealand Model Code for Consumer Protection in Electronic 
Commerce, (Wellington, March 2000), [Electronic Commerce and the New Zealand Consumer]. 
52 Figures from IDC NZ as reported in the Dominion 11 .01 .00. 
53http: ://cyberatlas.internet.com/big_picture/geographics/art . . ./0, 1323 ,59 l 1_302481 ,00.htm 
26/06/2000. 
54 Electronic Commerce and the New Zealand Consumer, above n51, 2. 
-43 -
low value transactions. It may also be a function of human behaviour, 
consumers may like to experience expensive goods they wish to purchase by way 
of touch or inspection. The impact of social norms on consumer behaviour needs 
to be assessed before any definitive conclusions on this point can be drawn. 
55 ' The OECD has also looked at Internet Usage (see Appendix B). In summary, 
what the OECD has found is that there is rapid growth in the use of the Internet 
transactions, doubling the value of transactions every 12-18 months. Most of the 
activity is taking place between businesses (B2B) (approximately 70-85% of all 
business transacted is B2B according to OECD research). It is suggested in this 
paper that this is due to shift by companies to on line supply chain management 
with suppliers that they had an existing relationship with in the physical world. 
The statistics contained in Table 2 in Appendix B, show that apart from the 
United States only 10% of Internet users make purchases over the Internet and 
these are typically small value transactions. In certain sectors the evidence shows 
that e-commerce sales have achieved significant penetration. The OECD quotes 
that one quarter of all share transactions in the United States occur on line. 
Appendix B, Table 3 shows the distribution of e-commerce penetration by 
product as recorded by the Boston Consulting Group. 
This evidence indicates that the use of the Internet as a place to transact is 
growing at least in markets for intangible goods and low value items. 
C The impact of the Internet .· 
The OECD has considers the economic impact of the Internet is as follows: 56 
1. On price 
The Internet will widely improve efficiency due to reduced transaction and 
search costs, increased competition and more streamlined business approaches. 
55 Johnathan Cappel, E-Commerce:lmpacts and Policy Challenges Economics Department: 
Working Papers NO. 252, (OECD, 2000). 
56 Johnathan Cappel, above n55, 5-10. 
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There is some empirical evidence that currently prices for books and CDs sold 
over the Internet is lower than the physical world. 57 The Internet reduces the cost 
of changing ticket prices (there are no physical materials required to change the 
price) as the Internet is a flexible medium. There are no 'shoe leather costs' to 
the consumer to collect information about other competing products and service 
on line. The retailers may also have a better understanding of their customers 
which means that direct marketing and mass customisation of products is 
possible which may lead to more differentiation and more narrowly defined 
markets.58 It is suggested that if prices are based on an individual's own 
valuation of the product or service that there may be several prices for the same 
product or service. The greatest possibility for a change in a market is for those 
products and services that can be digitised as the production and delivery costs 
will be greatly minimised. 
2. On competition and policy 
The minimisation of reproduction costs may also be an argument for a reduction 
in competition in a market for goods and services that can be digitised. Firms 
operating in such a market will need to find a way of recovering their cost of 
producing the first item(s) produced. There may be issues for competition where 
Internet operators are large and create an established brand in the physical world. 
This may enable suppliers to un.der cut their competitors on the Internet to build 
market share and at the same time gain the trust of consumers. What may 
happen is that due to issues of 'trust management' which anse due to the 
57 Johnathan Coppel, above n55 , 14. This is based on research by Brynijolfsson and Smith, 1999. 
It is suggested that this may be because on line traders are facing a competitive market 
(evidenced by the number of Internet start-ups trading at a loss) . There is a race to grow market 
share and brand identification. 
58 Cookies for example gather information about the consumer's Internet habits without the 
consumer even knowing. A supplier can use that information to establish the interests and tastes 
of the consumer. 
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peculiarities of the Internet, consumers begin to trust a particular brand and will 
only purchase from established brands. 
On the other side of the competition argument is that the Internet offers a low 
barrier to entry market place due to the open and interoperable standards of the 
Internet, and therefore it may be difficult for one player to dominate the market. 
Technology may also advance so consumers, with the help of electronic agents 
that can navigate the Internet looking for particular triggers, for example a 
particular price, may reduce search costs to the consumer effectively shifting the 
power from the vendor to the consumer. 
3. Economic performance and macroeconomic policy. 
I will not go into this point in detail, as it does not directly impact on consumers 
entering into transactions but needs to be considered, as the decision to regulate 
will need to consider the wider macroeconomic effects. There may be an issue 
for New Zealand in attracting investment in local operations by our own citizens 
as New Zealanders may choose to invest in foreign companies due to the 
accessibility of the markets and of information about the markets. These factors 
will impact on the Government's decision on whether or not to harmonise laws 
with New Zealand's trade competitors. 
V. GOALS FOR REGULATING ON LINE TRANSACTIONS 
The Government has found it necessary to protect consumers from market 
failures in the physical world. The evidence shows that similar market failures 
could occur in cyber space. The increase in the popularity of the Internet and its 
use as a method of exchange, has prompted the Government to decide to regulate 
for transactions that occur on the Internet because the existing regulation may not 
be effective to protect consumers transacting on line. 
I have identified above that there are simultaneous benefits and issues for 
consumers that use the Internet to purchase goods and services. The consumer is 
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at particular risk of falling victim to the peculiarities of the Internet for many of 
the same reasons they are exposed to risk in the physical world. Of particular 
concern currently, is that consumers transacting on line, may inadvertently 
transact in another jurisdiction where the laws of New Zealand do not apply and 
that consumers may transact with an entity whose identity they are not certain. 
These, and the other issues identified earlier in this paper are of concern to 
consumers in particular because consumers may not appreciate the risks involved 
due to lack of understanding of the technology, and lack of experience and 
understanding of the issues that the new environment raises. Further even if 
consumers are aware of the issues they may incur high transaction costs if they 
need to enforce and identify their rights in another jurisdiction or under another 
state's law. This will not fit with the Government's policy of reducing 
transaction costs to consumers. 
These issues and more have come to the attention of the New Zealand 
Government. In October 1999 the Ministry of Consumer Affairs took part in an 
International Internet Sweep Day to assess how Internet shopping sites protect 
custome~s' interests.59 Over 700 sites were visited. Of those 700 sites: 
(i) More than half failed to outline their payment security mechanisms; 
(ii) 62% provided no refund or exchange policies, 
(iii) 75% have no privacy policy; 
(iv) 78% failed to explain how to lodge a complaint; 
(v) 90% failed to advise customers what laws applied to their transactions; 
and 
(vi) 25% failed to show a physical address. 
The Ministry of Consumer Affairs considers that something must be done to 
address these concerns and to protect consumers trading on line. 
60 The 
59 Electronic Commerce and The New Zealand Consumer, above n5 l, 3. 
60 Electronic Commerce and the New Zealand Consumer, above n5 l, 3. 
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Government has decided that there is an issue of consumer protection that needs 
to be addressed with respect to Internet transactions. Before any tools for 
regulation can be considered, the policy and goals of the Government need to be 
identified. 
The Internet does not change the policy goals of the Government. The policy is 
restated by, the then Ministry of Commerce in its publication, The Freezer Ship 
of the 21st Century. 61 That is, the economic policy in New Zealand of minimal 
regulation on the basis that voluntary transaction increase market efficiency, 
which in turn maximises welfare of society, and will influence the choice of tools 
the Government chooses to regulate on line transactions. 
Additionally there is no reason why the particular policy of the Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs needs to change because of the Internet. That is, consumers 
benefit from efficient markets, and markets can be made more efficient by 
lowering transaction costs. As discussed earlier the Internet might even be able to 
assist consumers by reducing transaction costs. 
The prevailing economic policy is not the only factor influencing regulation, 
before any action can be taken it is necessary to ascertain whether or not there 
are real or simply perceived problems with the Internet as a method of 
communication for trade.62 I have discussed potential issues at a qualitative level 
above that arise due to the architecture of the Internet. I have also reproduced 
some empirical evidence which __ may assist in divining the real problems from the 
perceived problems, but it can only be taken as indicative because of the 
difficulty of measuring electronic commerce.63 
61 Ministry of Commerce, The Freezer Ship of the 21st Century, (Wellington, November 1998) 
[Freezer Ship of the 21 51 Century]. 
62 Assessing the Costs and Benefits in Consumer policy Development, above n28, 2. 
63 OECD, Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy Measuring 
Electronic commerce, (Paris, 1997,5. In this report the OECD outlines the measurement hurdles 
which include defining electronic commerce, the speed of its growth and evolution, and the fact 
that often firms conduct both traditional and electronic commerce simultaneously. 
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Currently, low value transactions for digital products and services seem to be 
where consumers are comfortable transacting on the Internet, however electronic 
commerce is still embryonic, growth in electronic commerce transactions has 
been increasing by over 200% annually and technology is continually improving. 
It is difficult at this stage to ascertain why consumers are not using the Internet 
for more various transactions or for higher value transactions. 
Despite the fact that it is difficult to measure and conclude that the reason that 
consumers are not entering into electronic transactions with the vigour that 
businesses are, it is safe to assume that the problems identified may cause a 
market failure and therefore, in terms of Government policy, it is justifiable to 
regulate. 
The Government's regulatory objective is to encourage electronic commerce as 
evidenced by the following statements: 
(i) The Korea - New Zealand Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce 
states that; "this joint statement is intended to promote the development 
of electronic commerce in both countries ... " 
(ii) "The global emergence of electronic commerce will have a major impact 
on the New Zealand economy. It is imperative that New Zealand meets 
the challenges and takes advantage of the opportunities presented by this · 
new mode of business."64 
This goal is consistent with the goal of the OECD, United Nations and New 
Zealand's main trading partners, as is the particular goal relating to consumer 
protection, that is, to increase consumer confidence in electronic commerce.
65 
64 The Freezer Ship of the 21" Century, above n59, 8. 
65 Electronic Commerce and the New Zealand Consumer, 3-4, also noted in Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs, Consumer Policy Overview and Current Issues, (Wellington, November 
1999), 2. 
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The Law Commission has suggested a set of principles that it considers are 
necessary to guide regulators when considering issues of electronic commerce.
66 
Those principles are that any regulation should: 
(i) Allow people to choose the medium in which they wish to do business. 
(choice principle); 
(ii) Retain fundamental principles of contract and tort as far as possible. 
(adaptation principle); 
(iii) Be technologically neutral ; 
(iv) Ensure compatibility with our trading partners. (compatibility principle); 
and 
(v) · Allow private sector leadership.67 
In submissions on the Report the Government and private sector have accepted 
h . . 1 68 t e pnnc1p es. 
Having established that the Government ' s general policy of free market 
economics is unchanged by the Internet, and that the Government's objective is 
to increase consumer confidence in transacting on line in accordance with the 
principles suggested by the Law Commission. I consider below some of the tools 
the Government may use to regulate the problems of the Internet. 
VI. TOOLS TO REGULATE THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 
The Government will need to be cautious when regulating because the 
regulations will be ineffective if they cannot be enforced, and may reduce 
consumer confidence if the consumer is not aware that domestic law will not 
66 A Guide for the Legal and Business Community, above n40 ,13-18 
67 The fifth princpal was added after submissions on the first report were made, New Zealand 
Law Commission, A Basic Legal Framework: R58, (Wellington, 1999) [A Basic legal 
Framework] . 
68 A Basic Legal Framework, above n 67 , Executive Summary. 
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always apply. A consumer will not be able to enforce any rights they are given at 
law if they cannot identify the party that has caused the loss or if the laws of New 
Zealand do not apply to the transaction. Problems of identity and geography are 
therefore currently the key and complex problems that need to be addressed by 
some form of regulation, whether or not it is within the control of the 
Government. 
These problems arise due to the architecture of the Internet and are closely linked 
to consumer confidence. I am going to refer to the issue of managing consumer 
confidence in the Internet as a place to trade as 'trust management'. 
The Architecture of the Internet is not the only barrier to trust management. In 
New Zealand and internationally existing laws have also been identified as 
reducing confidence in the Internet because of the uncertainty of how the existing 
law will apply to transactions concluded on line, if at all. 
As the Government has decided to regulate to increase consumer confidence the 
Government needs to consider the tools it can use to achieve this, it may be that 
the existing tools are not enough to regulate the Internet, if they are not then 
thought will need to be given to alternatives. 
A Are the existing tools sufficient? 
I. Existing regulation incorporating existing tools 
In New Zealand where consumers transact with other New Zealanders on web 
sites based in New Zealand any issues arising from the transaction will fall 
within the scope of any applicable consumer protection legislation already in 
place. Those laws are technologically neutral. However, New Zealand 
legislation may offer no assistance to the consumer who transacts with a foreign 
seller, nor will it assist a consumer if the consumer cannot identify the party with 
whom they are transacting. 
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2. New regulation using existing tools 
(a) Harmonise domestic law 
To address the potential increase in transaction costs to consumers which relate 
to the issues of multiple jurisdictions being involved in a transaction New 
Zealand may attempt to harmonise its own laws with that of other states. 
Enacting legislation that mirrors that of another state, in particular Australia, as 
our closest trading partner, may do this in part. This was done with the Ff A and 
is being contemplated currently with respect to a proposed Electronic 
Transactions Bill.69 However, the Internet is global and consumers are 
potentially able to transact with anyone in the world that uses the Internet, it 
would be very difficult to harmonise our law with that of every state in the world 
in this way. 
New Zealand and Australia as members of The Ministerial Council of Consumer 
Affairs (MCCA)7° have made a start towards harmonising jurisdictional dispute 
resolution issues as a result of electronic commerce. In August 1999 the MCCA 
adopted principles for dealing with cross-jurisdictional complaints involving 
electronic commerce between their jurisdictions. The Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission is to determine the specific procedures for referral of 
complaints.71 
(b) Prohibit access to foreign web sites 
Another possible solution is for the Government to prevent consumers from 
entering into transactions that involve other jurisdictions by requiring that our 
international gateways are not made available to consumers. This suggestion 
would be unlikely to be accepted. It would have a negative impact on business to 
69 Ministry of Economic Development, Electronic Transactions Bill, Discussion Paper, (May 
2000, Wellington). [Electronic Transactions Bill]. 
70 The MCCA consists of the consumer affairs/ fair trading Ministers of the Commonwealth 
States and Territories in Australia and The New Zealand Minister of Consumer Affairs . 
71 Electronic Commerce and the New Zealand Consumer, above n51, 9. 
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business transactions because there is currently no way an ISP would be able to 
identify whether traffic was legal or illegal. If the Government was serious about 
preventing global traffic they would need to ban consumer ISPs altogether and 
leave it to businesses that required an Internet connection, to purchase their own 
access to the international gateways for their own business purposes. I suggest 
that this would not be accepted by the New Zealand public, and would result in 
interest groups lobbying Government for change. Despite any other issues this 
solution may cause, it is not desirable because it is inconsistent with the 
Government's policy of increasing efficiency through voluntary markets. By 
restricting access to global markets one of the greatest benefits of the Internet to 
consumers would be lost. 
( c) Multilateral Agreements 
Of the existing tools the only response that will be effective is an international 
co-ordinated response. This response needs to utilise the principles established 
by the New Zealand Law Commission, in particular the response needs to be 
technologically neutral as technology moves fast and laws and international 
agreements in particular, move slowly. Technology specific regulation will also 
have the unwelcome effect of distorting innovation.
72 
The Hague Conference has published a preliminary draft convention on 
jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopted by 
the Special Commission on 30 (?ctober 1999. The draft convention is designed to 
include in its scope almost all civil and commercial matters. 
Article 7 specifically provides for contracts concluded by consumers. A 
consumer is defined as a person who enters into a contract for purposes unrelated 
to their trade or profession. A consumer can bring an action in the country in 
which they live if the following conditions are met: 
72 David Goddard, "Does the Internet Require New Norms?" International Law Forum, 2, 183-
195 ["Does the Internet Require New Norms?"] 
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(i) The conclusion of the contract relates to activities that the defendant 
(which will, for the purposes of this paper be a supplier) has engaged in 
the consumer's home state or which the supplier directs activities; and 
(ii) The consumer has taken necessary steps for the conclusion of the contract 
in their home state. 
Similarly a claim can only be brought against a consumer in their home state. 
A supplier cannot contract out of these rules, however they are only default rules 
because a consumer may request a clause in the contract, for the consumer's 
benefit only, for an alternative jurisdiction. The only other way an alternative 
state will have jurisdiction is if the parties agree it after the dispute has arisen. 
This clause was drafted without taking into account issues of electronic 
commerce but it was discussed at the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law organised an expert meeting in Ottawa between 28 February 2000 and 1 
March 2000.73 At that meeting the draft convention as a whole was discussed in 
terms of electronic commerce. Issues with the current draft of the convention 
were identified at the meeting. The particular comments with respect to 
consumer protection are: 
(i) With respect to placing material on an Internet site the first condition will 
be met. 
(ii) The second condition 1s not a new issue as present day 
telecommunications allow a consumer to conclude a contract outside their 
habitual place of residence. 
(iii) The necessity of a business to bring an action against a consumer in the 
consumer' s own jurisdiction may be onerous on the small Internet 
business (of which there will be many). 
73 Catherine Kessedjian, Electronic Commerce and International Jurisdiction, (Ottawa, 28 
February to 1 March 200). 
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(iv) It has been suggested that a consumer who was fully informed of their 
rights could forgo the protection offered under clause 7 and opt instead 
for a choice of courts clause. The details of this were not recorded. 
The Special Commission's debate made it clear that the trade off was between 
encouraging consumer confidence in the Internet and encouraging small 
enterprises to offer goods and services over the Internet.
74 
Despite the issue of cross border transactions, the Government can still regulate 
for transactions that occur within New Zealand to increase efficiency where the 
existing law reduces confidence in electronic commerce. Existing tools can be 
used to do this also. 
(d) Facilitating credible commitments 
The Internet can decrease transaction costs to consumers who wish to purchase 
goods and services on line from domestic suppliers and because of this it is a 
valuable tool and should be encouraged. To this end the Government has 
produced a discussion paper which proposes a new Electronic Transactions 
Bill.75 It is proposed the Bill would be based on the Australian Electronic 
Transactions Bill 1999, which is based on the UNCITRAL model law, and 
among other things would provide that agreements made electronically would 
not be unenforceable because they were agreed electronically. The Bill is based· 
on the work of the Law Commission in its second report on Electronic 
Commerce.7
6 It is considered ' imperative by the Law Commission that the 
legislation New Zealand enacts is aligned with Australia as our major trading 
partner.77 
74 Electronic Commerce and International Jurisdiction, Ottawa, 28 February to 1 March 2000, 
summary of discussions, prepared by Catherine Kessedjian with the co-operation of the private 
international law team of the Ministry of Justice Canada. 
75 Electronic Transactions Bill, above n69. 
76 Electronic Transactions Bill, above n 69, 4. 
77 A Basic Legal Framework, above n 67, 10-14. 
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In the Law Commission's deliberations on the legal barriers to electronic 
commerce it concluded that the proposed Bill should apply equally to consumer 
transactions as it does to business transactions.
78 The Law Commission suggests 
that additional requirements may be necessary such as differentiating between 
provisions dealing with advertisements and those provisions that form part of the 
contract. 
(e) Self regulation 
Self regulation is currently the Government's preferred method of regulation. 
The Ministry of Consumer Affairs has drafted the New Zealand Model Code for 
Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce since the Law Commission 
published its reports on electronic commerce. It fits with the 5th principle of 
regulation which was suggested by the Law Commission, that is that the private 
sector should lead the way in developing confidence in electronic commerce. It 
is based on the OECD's Guidelines for Consumer Protection in Electronic 
Commerce. The Code will be voluntary and is designed to underpin efforts by 
business · to meet consumer's interests. The premise behind the guidelines is 
that:79 
Consumer laws, policies and practices limit fraudulent, misleading and unfair 
commercial conduct. Such protections are indispensable in building consumer 
confidence and establishing a more balanced relationship between businesses and · 
consumers in commercial transactions. 
The Code is a summary of the current legal obligations that business in New 
Zealand already has to comply with. However it goes further than that and 
provides a type of "best practice" of transacting on line, for exarr,iple, clause 28 
outlines the steps that a business should take to review a contract, accept or reject 
any errors and confirm or reject and offer. 
78 A Basic Legal Framework, above n 67, 50. 
79 Electronic Commerce and the New Zealand Consumer, above n5 l, 21. 
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Other suggestions for self regulation include seal of approval initiatives that are 
currently being considered by the International Marketing Standards authority. 
80 
(f) Education 
Educating consumers on the risks of the Internet and what they can do to 
minimise the risks will be an important part of increasing consumer confidence. 
There are many steps that a consumer can take to protect themselves from some 
of the risks of trading on line, however before they can do anything they must be 
aware of the risks. Education can be used to address in part at least most of the 
issues that arise transacting on line. 
(g) Market Regulation 
Another option that the Government has is to do nothing and leave it for the 
consuming public to decide whether or not they will accept the risk of the 
transaction. Efficient markets can emerge without Government intervention 
where markets are competitive or it may happen with in combination with 
education and self regulation initiatives of the Government. 
I suggest that market regulation combined with education could be used to 
address the issues that arise due to the control of the architecture of the Internet 
by code writers. Greenleaf points out that architecture can perish where market 
forces do not support it. In fact market forces may have much more force 
regulating cyberspace due to 1:etwork effects. Greenleaf describes network 
effects as; "markets in which the value that consumers place on goods increases 
as others use the goods."
81 
Lessig is concerned that code may displace the values of public iaw. He uses 
the examples of Intellectual Property (which many commentators target as a 
80 Electronic Commerce and the New Zealand Consumer, above n5 l, 15. 
81 Graham Greenleaf, above n 4, 10. 
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victim of Internet technology, not a benefactor) and contract which I have 
mentioned above. 82 
Lessig makes the point that the law serves public values and thought should be 
given to a regime that tries to displace those values. The Government will need 
to consider whether or not it wants to regulate architecture, one of the new tools 
suggested below, to prevent this from occurring if market forces are not 
effective. 
There is a real issue for consumers as self regulation by code writers is not 
transparent. The issue for consumers trading over the Internet is that they don't 
understand why they can only operate within a defined sphere. However if 
consumers do not like the restraints placed on them by one supplier they can 
"vote with their electrons" and shop elsewhere (assuming there are other 
satisfactory suppliers in the market). 
It is also important to note that technology has a tendency to evolve to create 
technological solutions to issues to that technology raises. Competing 
technologies tend to cancel each other out over time. 
B New Tools 
The existing tools can be used to regulate domestically and internationally to 
some extent, however they are not they only possible ways to regulate. They do 
not address all of the issues, for example the existing tools will not be able to 
regulate to prove a person's identity. Below I discuss new tools and new ways of 
using existing tools that may be used to regulate business to consumer electronic 
commerce. 
1. Law of Cyberspace 
There has been much debate over how the issues raised by electronic commerce 
can best be resolved. Some commentators are of the view that a new law of the 
Internet could be developed that would be enforced within the new jurisdiction of 
82 See part IV of this paper, The Online Environment. 
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cyberspace. Matthew Burnstein draws the analogy of the law merchant with the 
proposed new law cyberspace.
83 This would involve creating new norms, such as 
the law of Internet Torts. Other commentators, including the New Zealand Law 
Commission, consider that the existing laws are satisfactory and that there is no 
need for a Law Cyberspace. 
84 To develop a Law Internet would be contrary to 
the suggested adaptation principal of the Law Commission. 
2. ISP contracts 
Another suggestion 1s that ISPs enter into agreements with each other and 
consumers will then be subject to the dispute resolution, jurisdiction and choice 
of law terms their chosen ISP has agreed with other ISPs.
85 Burnstein's argument 
is that as all users must go through an ISP to get on line, the contract between 
ISPs could act as the equivalent of treaties among nations, the ISP could be both 
the legislator and the enforcer. 
86 I do not consider this to be a very efficient 
solution to the problem for the following reasons: 
(i) ISPs currently do not have to enter into agreements with each other, they 
do not need to due to the open platform of the Internet. This would be an 
additional cost that would be passed on to the consumer. If this logic was 
followed it may be more appropriate to put this obligation on the 
telecommunications network suppliers which already negotiate 
interconnect agreements with each other (however this would not avoid 
the other issues below). 
83 Matthew Burnstein, "The Internet and Territoriality" in K. Boele- Woelki and Kessedjian 
(eds), Internet- Which Court Decides? Which Law Applies ?, Quel tribunal decide ? Quel droits 
s'applique? (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998), 23-34. 
84 "Does the Internet Require New Norms?" above n 72, and A Basic Legal Framework, above n 
67, Executive Summary. 
85 Matthew Burnstein, above n 84. 
86 Matthew Burnstein, above n 84, 32. 
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(ii) There are potentially many more ISPs than there are countries so the 
number of agreements that would need to be entered into would be large, 
and negotiations would be continuing as new ISPs are and will be being 
established somewhere in the world all the time. This would mean that 
the cost would be high and interim solutions would still need to be 
developed while the negotiations were taking place. 
(iii) Most ISPs, especially in New Zealand are small compared to those in 
other jurisdictions, New Zealand may end up a "cyber ghetto", where 
New Zealand consumers would be subjected to foreign jurisdiction in 
most cross border trades, resulting in a low level of consumer confidence 
contrary to the aims of the Government; 
(iv) In the past businesses have not needed to use an ISP to access the Internet 
therefore there will be businesses that do not use an ISP. 
(Telecommunications companies sell businesses access to New Zealand's 
international gateways directly, they still do but a business will still need 
an ISP to be allocated IP numbers); and most importantly 
(v) Consumers can use many different ISPs without even knowing it. A 
consumer may use a different ISP at work, at home, on their mobile 
phone or if they use a cyber cafe, kiosk or a another person's computer. 
A consumer will often not know which ISP they are using and will be 
even less likely to know .what the terms of that ISP's contract are with the 
ISP which they are accessing somewhere else in the world. 
3. Regulate the Architecture 
The issue of identity is more difficult to resolve by legislation because the ability 
to identify a party to a transaction is a problem that arises from the architecture 
of the Internet not the law. The problem has an impact on the law in that the 
consumer will not be able to enforce their rights against an unknown party. 
Lawrence Lessig suggests that by regulating architecture the Government may be 
able to solve this problem, resolve the issues around privacy, and of control of 
the code by code writers. Architecture in the physical world has not been able to 
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be regulated in the same way because not even the Government can regulate for 
nature as it is not plastic. No law can stop river running through a town or rain 
from falling. The architecture of the Internet however is different, it is created by 
people and therefore potentially able to be regulated. 
While Lessig does not believe that any regulation of the Internet is necessary, he 
agrees that if a government regulates it should ensure the regulations are 
enforceable. 87 Lessig states that a government (in his case the United States of 
America) can "alter the regulability of the Internet."
88 The most effective way to 
do this is through regulating code. 
Lessig suggests that architecture may be regulated by:
89 
(i) Making identity self authenticating by modifying the Internet's code so 
that when a person connects to a web site information gets sent to the site. 
(ii) Creating legal incentives for code writers to give effect to consumer's 
(and the public's) rights. 
Lessig suggests that identity could be self authenticating by authenticating the 
browser or the IP address of the computer from which the consumer connects to 
the site. Both of these suggestions are flawed however as they assume that a 
computer's IP Address is static and that a browser is person~! and "detachable". 
A browser is software which is loaded onto a particular computer. Therefore the 
suggested solution is unhelpful ~or those without their own computer, for people 
that share a computer and for people that travel and use computers at cyber cafes 
or elsewhere. It also requires that the developers of the web site programme their 
servers to react appropriately according to the information that the browser or 
address delivers to it. Without this architecture suggested by Lessig will not be 
helpful. Additionally, It does not address the issue raised by the Global nature of 
the Internet as no doubt havens will develop where organisations can locate their 
87 Lawrence Lessig, above n 38,517 . 
88 Lawrence Lessig, above n 38,514. 
89 Lawrence Lessig, above n 38 514- 52. 
- 61 -
servers so they do not have to comply with any particular regulation. This
 would 
be of more assistance to suppliers rather than consumers as consumers w
ill be 
interacting with a web site which would not necessarily contain any 
feature 
which would allow the consumer to authenticate the supplier. 
However I am not suggesting it is impossible to do, but maybe a better way
 is 
through digital certificates and PKJ infrastructure. The electronic signature
 is 
one method of trust management. Electronic signatures are currently receiv
ing a 
lot of attention from the legislative and advisory bodies around the globe. 
There 
are multiple types of electronic signatures but the type that most countries 
that 
are addressing this issue are either adopting or discussing is known as 
asymmetric key cryptography. Using this approach one key is used to crea
te a 
document (private key) and another key, which is published or made availa
ble to 
particular parties, is made to verify the signature ("public key"). This form
 of 
electronic signature is defined in Singapore's Electronic Transactions Act 1
999 
as a Digital Signature. Each digital signature is unique to the document it i
s 
attached to and if the document is altered the digital signature is also altered
. 
For Digital Signatures to be effective with respect to "trust management" s
everal 
steps need to be taken: 
(1) Private keys must be issued or designed 
(2) Each private key must be unique 
(3) The identity of the authorised user must be guaranteed. 
(4) Private Keys must not be able to be interfered with, they must 
have integrity 
(5) Any private keys that are compromised must be able to be 
revoked 
(6) Public keys must be made available 
(7) Public keys must not be able to compromise the integrity of a 
private key 
The second initiative suggested by Lessig is to provide legal incentives to
 allow 
individuals to select preferences. This is a suggested as a way to in
crease 
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privacy on the Internet. Lessig identifies that the problem of the Internet is that 
the architecture is such that it interferes with regulation imposed by individuals 
(self regulation). Greenleaf explains that this is due to a combination of factors 
but particularly that the default regulation of the Internet architecture is on, that is 
computers are set to accept cookies, and in older computers at least, the software 
doesn't allow the user to turn this function off. Lessig, writing on the situation in 
the United States, suggests that the answer to this issue first requires the 
Government to establish some form of incentive for web site developers to 
request consent of consumers before they collect information from them. In New 
Zealand the Privacy Act 1993 already creates the incentive and we have not seen 
many web based suppliers offering consumers options for collection of personal 
information. 
Technical solutions have been developed for example P3P. P3P allows 
individuals to select their preferences about the exchange of private information 
and then an electronic agent will negotiate the trade of such data when the 
individual connects to any given site. This technology is still available to 
consumers without the intervention of the Government and can be adopted by 
consumers so they can continue to self regulate for the dissemination of 
information about themselves. 
I suggest that if the market demands tools such as P3P they will be invented and 
consumers will be able to choose whether or not they want to use them. There 
may however need to be a requirement that web site owners have to accept that 
they cannot circumvent the architecture. 
Regulation of architecture might work to increase the ability of a .government to 
regulate cyberspace within its borders to some extent. The mandatory use of PK.I 
technology would potentially give the Government a lot of control over the 
Internet. It may even get to the stage that known fraudsters would be denied an 
electronic signature and therefore denied the opportunity from participating in 
Internet transactions (whether or not the public will accept this is another issue). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Government has identified that the Internet should be encouraged because of 
its potential to increase market efficiency. This is consistent with the 
Government's pre existing policy for regulation. However the Government has 
also identified the Internet creates problems for consumers which will need to be 
addressed if consumer confidence in the Internet is to increase. In particular the 
issues arising from anonymity are critical issues relating to the effectiveness of 
any regulatory efforts. 
The Government's existing consumer protection tools and regulations will 
continue to be effective in so far as transactions are completed within New 
Zealand's jurisdictional borders. However to the extent they are not effective 
international initiatives will need to be invoked such the draft Hague Convention 
on Jurisdiction and foreign judgments in Civil and Commercial matters. Treaties 
are an appealing method of Internet governance. Nations are accustomed to 
negotiating treaties and may be prepared to consider them more readily than 
dramatic and confusing technological solutions. Treaties are also appealing 
because they may be brokered by international organisations. 
Where the Government can regulate to increase efficiency domestically it can 
still do so, it will need to be careful however not to lull consumers into a false 
sense of security where those regulations will not be enforced outside New 
Zealand. 
However government regulation causes its own difficulties, as it is relatively 
inflexible and slow to adapt to change (the new issues that have arisen, as a result 
of electronic commerce are evidence of that). Additional issues with government 
regulation include: 
(i) Government agencies may lack information themselves; 
(ii) the direct cost of developing and enforcing the regulations are high and 
borne by all taxpayers (even those that don ' t require protection due to 
their own personal attributes); 
(iii) the cost of complying and implementing regulation can be high; 
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(iv) government regulation sets a minimum standard only; 
(v) government regulation is risks being indiscriminate; 
(vi) the cost of regulation should fall only on those markets which the 
regulation is targeted. 
Therefore one option that a government has is to do nothing or, require that the 
industry regulates itself. 
If the market can address the potential market failure or unfairness itself there 
will be good reason for the Government to leave resolution of the problem to 
market regulation. If not the Government may have to consider new tools for the 
regulation of electronic commerce, for example regulating the Architecture of the 
Internet. 
It will be important for the growth of electronic commerce to achieve a 
resolution of the issues around conflict of laws, jurisdiction and identity. 
Without this transaction costs will be high and the benefits of electronic 
commerce to will not be fully harnessed by consumers. Any change to New 
Zealand's domestic law to facilitate electronic commerce will only go part of the 
way to increase consumer confidence. It will still not allow consumers to benefit 
from the global nature of the Internet, which is the Internet's primary benefit. 
s 
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VIII. APPENDIX A 
In relation to the supply of goods the CGA implies guarantees: 
(i) as to title, 
(ii) acceptable quality (whether or not goods are of acceptable quality is 
determined in accordance with section 7 as detennined from the 
perspective of a reasonable consumer), 
(iii) as to fitness for particular purpose (unless it can be shown that the 
consumer does not rely on the suppliers' skill or judgement or it would be 
unreasonable for the consumer to do so.), 
(iv) that goods comply with description, 
(v) that goods will correspond with the sample and the customer will be 
~iven an opportunity to compare goods to with the sample, 
(vi) as to reasonable price (other than where the price is determined by 
contract), 
(vii) as to repairs and spare parts (where goods are first supplied to a consumer_ 
in New Zealand the manufacturer will take reasonable steps to ensure that 
facilities to repair the goods are available for a reasonable period after the 
supply. 
The CGA also grants the following guarantees to the provision services:90 
(i) As to use of reasonable skill and care, 
(ii) As to fitness for a particular purpose, 
(iii) As to completion within a reasonable time 
(iv) As to a reasonable price 
90Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, sections 28-31. 
6 
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IX. APPENDIX B 
A Table 1 
--- Table 2. Consultant estimates of world-wide e-commerce----
Billions $ 
1999 2003 
Average annual 
growth 
e-Marketer 98.4 1 244 89 
IDC 111.4 1 317 85 
ActivMedia 95 1 324 93 
Forrester Lowa 70 1 800 125 
Forrester Higha 170 3 200 108 
Boston Consulting Group 1 OOO 4 600 46 
a) includes Internet-based EDI. 
Source: Cited in e-Marketer (2000) and Boston Consulting Group (1999b ). 
B Table 2 
Table 3. B2C e-commerce in selected OECD countries 
Value of Value of Penetration rate, 
Number of Number of Number of 
transactions - transactions - per cent of retail 
buyers, buyers, as a per buyers, as a per 
1999, sus growth rate sales thousand, end cent of Internet
 cent of working 
million (1999198) 1998 users age population 
United States 24170 195 0.48 19 666 39 11 .1 
Japan 1 648 334 0.06 
Germany 1 199 200 0.30 1 370 13 2.4 
France 345 215 0.14 310 8 0.8 
Italy 194 145 0.09 360 12 0.9 
United Kingdom 1 040 280 0.37 970 11 2.5 
Canada 774 166 0.26 811 12 4.0 
Australia 803 13 6.4 
Austria 96 210 0.23 120 13 2.2 
Belgium 82 420 0.16 90 11 1.3 
Denmark 46 220 0.20 90 8 2.5 
Finland 51 160 0.22 160 10 4.7 
Greece 30 11 0.4 
Ireland 40 13 1.6 
Netherlands 182 210 0.34 320 13 3.0 
Norway 61 200 0.26 100 10 3.5 
Portugal 70 185 0.06 50 11 0.7 
Spain 70 185 0.06 220 11 0.9 
Sweden 232 170 0.68 260 10 4.6 
Switzerland 127 110 0.29 130 12 2.7 
Sources: OECD Secretariat; Boston Consulting Group; Wartlurg Dillon Read; Retail Council of Canada; MITI (Japan); and 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
6 
C Table 3 
0inancial brokerage 
Computer hardware 
and software 
Books 
Event tickets 
Consumer 
electronics 
• 
• 
Music, video ---
Travel --
Toys 
... 
I 
Apparel • < 0.5 percent • 
Home, garden 
1 < 0.5 percent 
Food, wine 1 < 0.5 percent 
0 2 
1. As a percent of sales. 
Source: Boston Consulting Group (1999a). 
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Figure 4. E-commerce penetration by product, 1999 
- United States - Europe 
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